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ABSTRACT

Oyster production in Virginia has declined dramatically
in the past ten years, causing Virginia oyster processors to
rely increasingly on oyster supplies from other regions.

In

response to the industry problems, the Virginia Marine
Resources Commission (VMRC) developed and began implementing
an Oyster Fishery Management Plan (OFMP) in 1985.
Primarily, the plan seeks to increase Virginia oyster
production from both public and leased grounds.

A large

increase in production could significantly affect the oyster
market.

There is thus a need to understand the Virginia oyster
market, which derives raw material supplies primarily from
public and leased-grounds production and from other states.
Although the level of competition among the three sources is
uncertain, it is thought to be substantial and quite
important for the success of the OFMP.

This study assesses

the level of competition and associated sector interaction.
A simultaneous equation system is specified and estimated by
Full-Information-Maximum-Likelihood procedure.

Estimates

and a market simulation model are used to assess the impact
of the OFMP on market behavior.

Analyses indicate that the market for the public ground
fishery consists of an elastic demand and an inelastic
supply, but the market for private oyster cultivation
consists of an inelastic demand and an elastic supply.

The

market interaction between the eastern oyster and Pacific
oyster is weak.

Oysters from leased grounds compete with

supplies from other regions and with Pacific oysters.

Market simulations indicate that the OFMP will increase
total revenue for both public and private producers,
suggesting that (1) the seasonal closure on commercial
oyster fishery may be extended as stock size recovers,

(2)

increasing private production may reduce oyster supplies
from other states, and (3) from the market interaction point
of view, the Pacific oyster may be an alternative for
private oyster planters.

x

MARKET INTERACTIONS AND COMPETITION BETWEEN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE OYSTER PRODUCTION AND SUPPLIES FROM OTHER STATES

INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

introduction

The oyster fishery was once one of the more important
fisheries in Virginia.

Annual production of the eastern

oyster (Crassostrea virglnica) was over five million bushels
between 1890 and 1925 (Haven et al ., 1981), but due to
overexploitation, oyster production fell to 2.5 million
bushels from 1926 through the late 1950's (Insley, 1986).
Oyster production further declined from the presence of MSX
(Haplosporidium nelsoni) and "Dermo" (Perkinsus marinus),
and in 1991, annual oyster production dropped to 0.2 million
bushels (VMRC, 1992).

Prior research has suggested that the large decline in
oyster production may result from several factors.

The

outbreak of MSX in 1959 reduced private oyster production
initially, and its persistence, combined with "Dermo," has
continued to discourage private oyster planting (Bosch and
Shabman, 1989; Hargis and Haven, 1988a; Haven and Whitcomb,
1986).

Overfishing is the most important factor affecting

the production of public ground fisheries (Hargis and Haven,
2

1988a; Haven et a l . , 1981).

Other factors such as

inadequate oyster management policy, degradation of
environmental quality, reduction in spatfall, high costs of
production, and market competition from Gulf and west coast
states also resulted in production decline (CEC, 1989;
Hargis and Haven, 1988b; Haven et al., 1981; JLARC, 1984;
Haven and Fritz, 1986; Haven and Whitcomb, 1986; Insley,
1986; Thunberg, 198 6).

In response to industry and resource problems, the
Virginia Marine Resources Commission (VMRC) developed and
began implementing an Oyster Fishery Management Plan (OFMP)
in 1985.

Primarily, the plan seeks to increase Virginia

oyster production from both public and private leased
grounds and to maximize biological, sociological, and
economic benefits with available resources (Bosch and
Shabman, 1988; Insley, 1986).

Success of the oyster management strategy, however,
requires an understanding not only of oyster production but
also of the market's effect on the goals established to
benefit the oyster industry.

As total Virginia production

declines, the demand for Virginia oysters is affected by
insufficient supplies; thus, Virginia oyster processors have
had to rely increasingly on oyster supplies from other
regions.

For instance, supplies from other states were

negligible before the outbreak of MSX in 1959, but over half
of the oysters shucked in Virginia now come from Maryland
and the Gulf states (VMRC, 1989).

Unfortunately, little

information is available on the current Virginia oyster
market or on the market relationships between public ground
fishery, private oyster cultivation, and oyster supplies
from other regions.

Objectives

Since the success of management strategies requires an
understanding of the market conflicts between the public
ground fishery, private cultivation, and oyster supplies
from other regions, several important questions must be
addressed.

What are the market relationships between public

and private leased grounds and supplies from other states?
If the goals of the oyster management plan are reached, what
will be the impact of the plan on the Virginia oyster
market?

What is the effect of private oyster production on

oyster supplies from other regions?

What is the market

relationship between the native Virginia oysters and Pacific
oysters —

will Pacific oysters compete with native oysters

in the Virginia shellstock market?

This study analyzes the interrelationships between

public ground fishery, private cultivation, and oyster
supplies from other regions, using econometric models of
production and market conditions.

A simulation then

evaluates the oyster fishery management plan's impact on the
Virginia oyster market.

Objectives of this study are as

follows:

1.

To construct an empirical framework of the
interrelationships of public ground fishery,
private cultivation, and supplies from other
regions;

2.

To develop modeling specifications for econometric
analysis, including
(a)

the demand for unshucked oysters from public
grounds, private leased grounds, and supply
from other regions,

(b)

the supply of oysters from public and private
leased grounds, and

(c)

3.

the identities for market equilibrium; and

To specify a simulation model for public ground
fishery, private cultivation, and supplies from
other regions based on the econometric model.

THE U.S. AND VIRGINIA OYSTER FISHERIES

Introduction

The oyster fishery has been traditionally one of the
more important fisheries in the world (Borgese, 1980).
Numerous oyster species are exploited worldwide: among them,
the eastern oyster {Crassostrea virginica), European flat
oyster (Ostrea edulis), and Pacific or Japanese oyster
(Crassostrea gigas) comprise over 80 percent of total
worldwide oyster production (Table 1).

However, oyster

production is concentrated primarily in a few countries —
South Korea, Japan, the United States, and France —

which

account for approximately 8 0 percent of total worldwide
production (Table 2).

The U.S. Oyster Fisheries

In the United States, two major oyster species have
been exploited: the eastern oyster on the east coast and
Gulf region and the Pacific oyster on the west coast.

This

geographic distinction does not imply that other species are
not utilized on either coast; for instance, the eastern and
6

Table 1.

Worldwide oyster harvests by species
(metric tons).

O.
edulis
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

6426
7661
7114
1,137
1, 354
9368
1,344
1,810
15,359
13,267
14,613
17,700
16,168

C.
gigas

C.
viginica

Other
Species

Total

435,059
422,674
498,716
487,741
488,472
556,709
567,544
614,938
620,297
690,561
707,671
649,327
654,706

325,399
303,750
329,971
329,469
324,768
321,504
303,028
272,604
254,704
229,608
192,401
183,142
148,033

133,993
139,005
135,883
134,416
150,235
153,962
158,364
187,947
192,279
178,684
179,841
192,347
209,747

900,877
873,090
971,684
961,763
973,829
1,041,543
1,042,280
1,088,299
1,082,639
1,112,120
1,094,526
1,042,516
1,028,654

Sources: FAO Yearbook, Fishery Statistics:
Catches and Landings, 19 81 - 1990

Table 2.

1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

Oyster production by major producing nations
(metric tons).

France

Japan

95,304
105,919
109,675
92,984
96,519
109,191
112,445
139,786
146,319
138,424
137,783
146,766
153,843

232,068
205,509
261,323
235,241
250,288
253,247
257,126
251,247
251,574
258,776
270,858
256,313
248,793

S . Korea
158,283
171,118
187,033
206,361
189,204
218,463
211,886
254,515
268,775
303,223
298,719
256,262
248900

USA

Total

314,383
290,083
314,714
313,637
315,193
307,033
284,260
260,449
234,273
217,632
167,700
158,425
148,497

900 ,877
873 ,090
971 ,684
961 ,763
973 ,829
1 ,041 ,543
1 ,042 ,280
1 ,088 ,299
1 ,082 ,639
1 ,112 ,120
1 ,094 ,526
1 ,042 ,516
1 ,028 ,654

Sources: FAO Yearbook, Fishery Statistics:
Catches and Landings, 1981 - 1990

European oysters are also raised on the west coast but on a
smaller scale.

The European flat oyster, introduced into

the New England area from Holland in 1949 (Clime and Hamill,
1979), has been underutilized because of its slow rate of
growth in cold water.

Production of the European oyster is

relatively small compared to the eastern and Pacific
oysters.

The Pacific oyster was introduced on the west coast in
the 1920s after the population of the native Olympia oyster
(O. lurida) was damaged severely by overfishing (Wiegardt,
1988), but the water temperature of the west coast was often
too cold for Pacific oysters to spawn naturally.
Subsequently, a large number of Pacific seed oysters were
imported from Japan, because of the undesirable fluctuation
of natural production of Pacific seed oysters.

Until the

late 1970s, the west coast Pacific oyster production
depended primarily upon the availability of Pacific seed
oysters from Japan.

As prices of Pacific seed oysters

increased, the seed supplies from Japan became difficult to
obtain, and in response, local oyster producers developed
hatcheries (chew, 1984).

These became very important to west coast oyster
farmers.

A new technique, called remote setting, was

initiated in 1982 (Chew, 1984).

Traditionally, spat and

seed oysters were produced in local hatcheries, but the new
technique, which allowed many eyed-larvae to be shipped to
distant areas and had a fairly high success rate for spat
collection in tanks, promised to produce a large quantity of
seed oysters in any suitable location.

The Pacific oyster,

produced in hatcheries and then raised on private leased
grounds now accounts for most west coast oyster production
(NOAA, 1977; Burrell, 1983).

The eastern oyster is a native oyster found all along
the coast of the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf of Mexico
(Galtsoff, 1964; NMPS, 1977), with the Gulf Coast and the
Chesapeake Bay the major resource areas.

Many states in

these areas have extensive oyster repletion programs that
attempt to enhance and maintain stock levels via planting
oyster shells and seed oysters on state-owned grounds.

The

programs may provide sufficient stock levels for maintaining
a fishery on public grounds and low cost seed oysters for
private oyster growers.

Unfortunately, oyster production on the east coast has
declined dramatically (Fig. 1).

The sharp decline in

eastern oyster production is believed to be associated
primarily with MSX and "Dermo" diseases and overfishing.
For example, the oyster fishery in Delaware has been closed

Figure 1

The U.S. oyster production, 1977-1990.
(Source: Fisheries of the United States)
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since 1985 as a result of MSX-related mortalities {Lewis,
1987), and oyster production in Maryland fell to about 0.3
million bushels in 1988.

Similarly, in Virginia, most

public grounds were no longer producing market oysters,
except for the James River areas (CEC, 1989, Barber and
Mann, 1991).

The Virginia Oyster Fisheries

Virginia oysters are harvested from state-managed
public grounds and private-leased grounds.

The Virginia

legislature has defined that the right to use the natural
oyster grounds belongs to all citizens of the state.
However, in the past, the lack of a definite boundary for
natural oyster beds resulted in a conflict between oystermen
and private planters on the use of state-owned oyster
grounds (Armstrong, 1879).

In 1892, a survey by J.B. Baylor

divided all the Virginia tidal water areas into two
categories, within the Baylor survey and outside the Baylor
survey.

The Baylor survey, also called public grounds,

contains the most naturally productive oyster beds (Fig. 2),
while the area outside the survey does not produce oysters
naturally and may be leased to whomever desires to use the
grounds for oyster cultivation (Richmond News Leader, 193 0).

Figure 2

Virginia shellfish grounds.
(Reprinted from JLARC, 1984)

°>\iver

Onginal Baylor Survey a n d Additional
Public O yster Grounds S et A side by
Legislation
Location of Private L eased
O yster Grounds
P tijlic Clam Grounds
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Hand tongs, patent tongs, and dredges are the common
tools used to harvest oysters (Fig. 3).

The number of

oyster gear licenses varies and may be related to stock
abundance (Table 3).

Additionally, oysters are harvested

frequently by hand on the seaside of the Eastern Shore
(Insley, 1986; VMRC, 1989).

Once harvested, market oysters

are sold to shucking or packing houses for further
processing; seed oysters (larger than one inch) are sold to
a buy-boat or trucker for transplanting onto private leased
grounds.

The variation of seed production may depend on the

needs of private planters.

Prior to 1980, over 75 percent

of seed oysters supplied to private planters were from the
James River (Haven et a l ., 1981).

The private leased grounds are not naturally productive
and thus require considerable effort and expense to
cultivate oysters. Because they do not produce enough seed
oysters to satisfy the needs of private planters, seed
oysters must be harvested from public grounds and
transplanted onto the leased bottoms.

The rate of planting

seed oysters on the leased grounds is 500-1000 bushels per
acre (Haven et al., 1981).

Frequently, these bottoms are too soft to support

Figure 3

Types of oyster gears.
(Reprinted from JLARC, 1984)

CATCH

PATENT TONGS

OYSTER OREDGE
ROPE
MESHING

DUMP RING

CHAIN LINKS

Table 3.

Annual number of oyster gear licenses in Virginia.

Year
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

Hand
3
3
4
3
4
3
3
2
3
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Patent

234
413
431
879
096
912
214
885
217
098
129
679
309
191
865
540
485
310
376
568
758
711
867
052
189
956
968
942
717
785
403
594
755
524
257
149

Data source: VMRC

345
370
388
291
275
247
120
49
48
57
28
24
41
22
20
4
8
5
24
74
95
159
215
284
286
379
436
345
278
423
440
373
225
5
41
60

Dredge
43
30
8
1
50
104
28
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
5
11
28
25
41
235
144
160
138
141
94
121
121
131
44
0
0
1

oyster growth, so an initial shell planting should be
carried out to firm the bottom before transplantation.

To

cover an acre of leased ground one inch deep with shells
requires over 2 000 bushels of oyster shells (Webster and
Meritt, 1988).

The amount of shells needed to stabilize the

bottom depends upon the type of the ground and the rate of
bottom sedimentation.

In 1986, approximately 110,000 acres

outside the Baylor survey were made into private leased
grounds on a relatively small scale; over 80 percent of
leases held were less than 20 acres (Haven et a l ., 1981).

Oyster production from private leased grounds has
declined drastically from the time prior to the occurrence
of MSX in 1959, when production from private leased grounds
comprised most of Virginia's production.

By 1990, less than

40 percent of total production was from private leased
grounds (Fig. 4) .

The continuous decline in production from

private leased grounds resulted primarily from the
persistence of MSX and "Dermo,11 as well as from high
production costs (Bosch and Shabman, 1989; Haven and
Whitcomb, 1986) .

It is believed that less than 10 percent

of leased grounds are productive (VMRC, 1989) .

Prior to the MSX epidemic, oyster supplies from outside
Virginia were negligible (VMRC, 1989) , but after total

Figure 4

Virginia oyster production.
(Source: Hargis and Haven, 1988; VMRC, 1991)
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production of Virginia oysters declined sharply, Virginia
oyster processors were forced to look elsewhere for
supplies.

Currently, over half of the oysters shucked in

Virginia come from other states (Table 4), primarily from
Maryland and the Gulf states.

Virginia Oyster Management and Problems

The Baylor grounds set aside for public use are managed
by VMRC.

Small portions of public grounds within the James

River, Great Wicomico River, Piankatank River, and the
seaside of the Eastern Shore are designated seed oyster
areas, where the spat set is intensive but the growth of
oysters slow.

The purpose of the seed areas is to provide

sufficient seed oysters to the Oyster Repletion Program
(ORP) and to private oyster planters.

The minimum size for a market oyster is three inches,
except for oysters taken from the James River seed areas,
which may be 2.5 inches; however, there are no size limits
on oysters taken from those seed areas and sold as seed
oysters.

If market oysters are being caught, culling

consists of returning to the water all empty shells and
undersized oysters.

Market oysters are processed in

Table 4.

Virginia oyster production and supplies from
outside Virginia (VA Bushels).

Year

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

Maryland1

Gulf2

1,340,266
970,303
536,432
607,672
678,510
616,611
271,378
258,844
333,637

6,987
226,878
352,813
134 ,983
139,503
65,232
140,595
139,342
110,087

Others
75,940
10,558
5,965
35,981
3,066
31,857
69,420
57,877
35,001

Total Outside
Virginia
Supplies
Production
1,423,193
1,207,739
895,210
778,636
821,079
713,700
481,393
456,063
478,725

959,032
790,400
631,769
647,967
678,117
843,398
667,446
398,463
391,504

Source: VMRC data.
1: Including oysters from Potomac River but landing in VA.
2: Including Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Texas.
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shucking or packing houses.

Only one type of gear, either hand tong, patent tong,
or dredge is allowed at one time, but two of the same type
are permissible at once.

Hand tongs are commonly used on

the public ground fishery, although patent tongs and dredges
are more efficient thanks to their mechanical assistance.
However, patent tongs and dredges may damage oyster beds;
therefore their usage is restricted on certain public
grounds.

The daily catch limit of market-size oysters is 15
bushels per person by hand tong or 45 bushels per boat.

The

oyster fishing season is circumscribed by time, fishing
gear, and area, but in general, oysters may be harvested
from October l to June l by hand tongs and from November 1
to March 1 by patent tong and dredge.

In addition, Virginia

prohibits oystering from sunset to sunrise, and on Sunday.

The Virginia Marine Resources Commission also manages
an Oyster Repletion Program (ORP).

The goal of the ORP is

to provide sufficient seed oysters for VMRC to maintain
adequate oyster stocks on public grounds (Haven et al.,
1981) ; it also provides sufficient quantities of seed
oysters at a low price to private oyster growers.

The ORP
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has been used by VMRC since the 1920s to maintain the stocks
on the public grounds.

Primarily, the program spreads

oyster shells as cultch material in known striking areas for
spat settlement.

Since the occurrence of MSX started in

1960, transplanting seed oysters to suitable growing areas
on public grounds has expanded as a disaster-relief program
to support public ground fishery (Baker et al., 1977).

A program of bagless dredging, was started in 1986 to
clean the previously planted shells in order to enhance an
oyster strike (Insley, 1986).

The shells are cleansed by

dragging a bagless crab dredge over the oyster beds, dredge
serving essentially as a rake with the teeth picking up
shells on the bottom, while the sediment is carried away
with the tide or current.

The area outside the Baylor survey may be leased from
VMRC by private oyster growers for renewable ten-year
periods.

Each lessee may not have more than 3,000 acres

outside of the Chesapeake Bay area or 500,000 acres within
the Bay, but aside from that, there are few laws and
regulations pertaining to harvesting oysters from private
leased grounds.

Limits such as those on market-size oysters

and harvesting gears are not imposed on private leased
grounds, and therefore, highly efficient dredges are
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typically employed on private leased grounds.

Unlike the

public grounds fishery, there is no seasonal closure on
private leased grounds.

In addition to disease and other environmental factors,
the decline in Virginia oyster production is thought to have
been caused by inadequate management (Hargis and Haven,
1988).

Although limits on size, daily catch amounts, type

of gear, and seasonal closures have been used to limit the
harvesting of oysters from public grounds, these
restrictions may have had little effect on controlling total
mortality and thus conserving the oyster resource (CEC,
1989).

However, oystermen believe that the decline in oyster
production from public grounds may not have been caused by
overfishing, but rather by other factors such as disease and
environmental degradation.

In 1979, oyster production from

public grounds was about 0.8 million bushels, a level higher
than any year from 1952 to 1985 (Stagg, 1985).

Haven et al.

(1981) argues that there were three factors responsible for
the increase in public production in the late 1970s: first,
a low salinity had persisted since 1972, reducing the impact
of disease; second, tropical storm Agnes caused a flood in
1972, wiping out oyster predators and increasing oyster

24
survival in later years; and finally, new fishing grounds
around the Pocomoke-Tangier Sound areas were opened to
dredges in 1978, increasing public production.

In addition

to Haven's suggestions, two other factors may have been
responsible for high production in the late 1970s.

Massive

shelling occurred between 1973 and 1976 (Table 5), and large
seed oyster transplanting took place between 1970 and 1974,
excepting fiscal year 1972-73.

An intensive spatfall in the

lower James River during these periods might be related to
the massive shelling (Haven and Fritz, 1986).

Second, the

number of licenses issued in the early 1970s was relatively
low, thus reducing pressure on the stocks.

However, production and number of licenses may not be
satisfactory indicators of what proportion of a stock is
harvested.

An alternative indicator —

effort (CPUE) —

catch per unit

is often used to indicate a relative change

in stock size (Anthony, 1989).

However, fishing effort is

difficult to determine; thus, calculating CPUE usually
involves obtaining a proxy measure for effort (Anderson,
1986), such as the number of licenses.

Although, the number

of oyster licenses does not exactly indicate fishing effort,
it is the only complete data available from VMRC.

Catch per

unit effort (CPUE) of Virginia oysters is obtained by
dividing public production by the number of hand tong

Table 5.

The number of bushels of seed and
shell planted on the public grounds
by fiscal year (VMRC).

Fiscal
Year
1961-62
1962-63
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
1968-69
1969-70
1970-71
1971-72
1972-73
1973-74
1974-75
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90

Seed
Transplanted
96450
23358
82350
9577
95425
37500
53418
57366
114613
129122
114866
0
118901
50379
90273
50702
80837
33822
65483
61291
12321
33245
11824
26579
42136
111232
155699
204392
186392

Shell1
Planted
421871
1054819
2318379
4148702
2978088
2241563
2884580
1032944
944897
1488494
946826
1885718
2256007
3481727
3608737
1471791
762061
1153165
1193057
1474432
1443080
1437441
1297148
1956099
1860090
1551294
1805986
1801814
1107376

Note:
1 - including reef shell and house shell.
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licenses (Fig. 5).

The patent tongs and dredges are not

considered in the CPUE, since these gears are used primarily
on private leased grounds and certain limited public
grounds.

Relatively high CPUEs, associated with a low number of
licenses and high production, were found between 1978 and
1980.

High production from public grounds was caused partly

by an increase in dredged production as Haven et al.
mentioned (Table 6).

(1981)

However, public production by hand

tongs also increased in this time period, and thus, the
level of stock may simply have been high during these
periods.

Although oyster stocks in the late 1970s were likely to
recover from the long-run depletion, most CPUEs remained
low.

In general, the phenomenon of overfishing is indicated

when the level of CPUE is relatively low and interspersed
with unusual peaks (Anthony, 1989).

Generally, high peaks

are related to good recruitment but not to the success of
management.

VMRC may have been confused by the unusual

recruitment and ignored the signal of declining stocks.

The oyster CPUE declined quickly as the number of hand
tongs remained at high levels in the early 1980s.

The

Figure 5

The CPUE for Virginia oyster fishery.
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Table 6.

Oyster landings from public grounds by gear type.

Year

Dredges

1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

0
6856
6783
19181
38151
165242
175622
167943
73814
76799
25991
48584
53544
24625

Source: VMRC.

Hand/Patent

Others

Total

351669
478245
430179
367469
422306
578841
533665
570179
499831
344316
255228
318557
294830
398352

0
0
0
12053
9791
27764
26309
31706
17101
42146
38101
31145
11813
11040

351669
485101
436962
398703
470248
771847
735596
769828
590746
463261
319320
398286
360187
434017
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public ground fishery collapsed from the prevalence of
disease between 1985 and 1988; public production fell from
800,000 bushels in 1979 to 60,000 bushels in 1991.

One impediment to production may be oyster bed
depletion.

An oyster bed consists of oysters, shells and

other cultches.

As oysters are taken from a bed, shells and

cultches are brought up together, meaning the sizes of
productive beds may be reduced —
the 'ground externality'

a phenomenon identified as

(Agnello and Donnelley, 1976).

Eventually, if there is no reshelling of the beds, the
naturally productive beds are reduced or destroyed by the
public ground fishery.

The importance of the ORP is to

eliminate the ground externality of the fishery.

Haven and Whitcomb (1986) surveyed about 84 percent of
the total public oyster grounds and found that average
oyster production of public grounds was low.

Only 22

percent of the total surveyed areas were considered as to
have a moderate or high potential for oyster productivity in
which the bottoms consisted of shells or cultches.
Reduction of the productive beds occurs primarily because
harvest levels exceed replenishment of public beds (Andrews,
1991), and because with limited resources, the ORP can only
maintain up to 10 percent of total public grounds (Hargis
and Haven, 1988).

The decrease in the sizes of oyster beds
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indicates that the current management regime of the ORP is
maintaining the rebuilt beds insufficiently.

Existing oyster laws and regulations, which have
developed over years and are concerned mainly with managing
the traditional fisheries, may be inadequate for private
oyster cultivation.

Although there are few limitations on

harvested oysters from private leased grounds, most
regulations for private oyster cultivation are associated
with owners' rights, which may involve the rights of
navigation, riparian rights, and public right to fishing
(Theberge and Neikirk, 1987).

These laws limit private

oyster growers from obtaining suitable sites or using other
culture techniques.

For instance, off-bottom cultivation

cannot be employed in the Virginia waters because it hinders
the rights of navigation.

JLARC (1984) suggested that Virginia oyster policy
should be changed to improve oyster production.

The

Agreement Commitment Report from the Chesapeake Executive
Council (CEC, 1989) concurred, stating that prior oyster
management was ineffective and that new regulations were
necessary.

In response, VMRC has been developing the Oyster

Fishery Management Plan (OFMP) to revive the industry (Table
7).

The objectives of the OFMP are to improve long-range

Table 7.

The goal and objectives of the Virginia oyster
fishery management plan.

G o a l:

To ’’achieve and maintain a level of Virginia's
public and private ground oyster stocks, to
generate the greatest possible biological,
sociological, and economic benefits from their
harvest and utilization.”

Objectives:
1.

By 1993, to increase public ground production
to at least 700,000 bushels (20 percent above
the ten year average). To the greatest
extent possible, reduce major inter-annual
fluctuation in public production.

2.

To assist private oyster producers in
ensuring an increase in private oyster ground
production, to 700,000 bushels (the
approximate 20-year average) by 1995.

3.

Ensure the collection of biological,
sociological, and economic data, as well as
fisheries statistics, in order to monitor and
evaluate the effectiveness of management
measures.

4.

Allow the Marine Resources Commission's
regulatory authority to impose effective and
timely management measures.

5.

Support water and habitat quality standards
necessary for natural production. Where
practical, encourage reclamation of condemned
oyster grounds through VMRC cooperation with
the State Water Control Board and other state
agencies.

Source: VMRC.

production and to achieve optimum yield for public ground
fishery and private production, based on its limited
resources.

However, production proposed under the OFMP is

much higher than the current production.

The OFMP is, thus,

likely to affect the Virginia oyster market.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, ECONOMIC MODEL, AND METHODOLOGY

Market:

The concept of a market is often quite confusing.

A

market may vary in geographic scope and be as limited as a
building or extended worldwide.

A market, the place or

context in which buyers and sellers buy, sell, or trade
goods and services, consists of buyers, sellers, and often
third parties such as brokers.

The object of the market may

be a good, a group of goods, or services.

In general, the

definition of a market depends upon its particular purpose
{Mansfield, 1985) ; for instance, the meaning of the term
'oyster market' may represent the entire oyster species,
with all types of oyster products being traded as a whole
around the world.

Historically, Virginia has been the nation's largest
producer of eastern oysters.

Oysters harvested from public

and private leased grounds were processed in Virginia
shucking houses and shipped primarily to areas outside
Virginia for further processing or consumption (Richmond
News Leader, 1930; Wheatley, 1959).
33

The processor's demand
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for oyster shellstock is the derived demand for the Virginia
oyster, and therefore, this study concerns itself primarily
with the oyster shellstock in Virginia as the market's
object.

Since a large quantity of oyster shellstock is from
other regions, this study proposes that the Virginia oyster
market consists of three sectors: oysters from public ground
fishery and private leased grounds in Virginia, and oyster
supplies from other states.

These market sectors will be

referred to hereafter as public, private, and outside supply
respectively.

Market Demand and Supply

A market may be characterized by demand and supply
curves, which indicate the amount of a commodity buyers are
willing to purchase and sellers are willing to sell at
various prices.

The demand curve of a normal good slopes

downward and to the right —

a negative slope.

A normal

good is a commodity with a demand related positively to
income.

The negative slope of the demand curve indicates

that an increase in price will decrease the quantity
demanded of a commodity (Fig. 6-a).

The supply curve is

Figure 6

The demand and supply curves.
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assumed to slope upward and to the right —
slope.

a positive

The positive slope of the supply curve suggests that

an increase in price will increase the quantity supplied of
the commodity (Fig. 6-b).

The demand and supply curves

represent the total demand and supply for the commodity at
various prices and at a particular period of time.

Changes in the demand and supply and changes in the
quantity demanded and supplied of a commodity must be
distinguished from one another.

A change in the demand or

supply shifts the demand or supply curve because of a change
in the relationship between price and quantity demanded or
supplied, resulting from a change in factors such as the
number of consumers and producers, consumer preference,
income, population, prices of related goods, or production
techniques.

A change in the quantity demanded or supplied

refers to the variations in quantity and price of a
commodity, given all other factors are held constant.

A

change in the demand or supply will shift the entire curve,
but a change in the quantity demanded or supplied results
only in a movement along the curve.

Market Equilibrium and Disequilibrium

The quantities demanded and supplied of a commodity

interact as price and production change.

The intersection

of the demand and supply curves in E is called the market
equilibrium (Fig. 6-c).

Once at market equilibrium E, the

quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied.

In reality,

the market may not be in equilibrium, because demand may not
equal supply.

However, if there are no outside influences

preventing prices from being bid up or down, the actual
price will move toward the equilibrium price, and the market
will converge at an equilibrium price-quantity combination
(Ferguson and Maurice, 1974) .

Alternatively, the demand and supply curves may shift
in response to changes in the number of consumers and
producers, consumer preference, income, population, prices
of related goods, or production techniques.

As the demand

or supply curve shifts, the market equilibrium changes.

The

new equilibrium will be established depending upon the new
intersection of demand and supply curves.

For example, a

market equilibrium is assumed to be at O (Fig. 7).

If an

increase in the demand for a commodity occurs and the supply
is held constant, the demand curve shifts from D to D,.
new market equilibrium is established at point A.

The

If an

increase in the supply of the commodity occurs and the
demand is held constant, the supply curve shifts from S to
Sl( and the new equilibrium is B.

If both demand and supply

of the commodity increase simultaneously, the equilibrium

Figure 7

Shifts in market equilibrium.
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may be established at point C.

The market equilibrium model has been criticized widely
(Bennassy, 1982; Bockstael, 1982; Doorn, 1975; Lambert.
1988) .

If the supply cannot increase immediately, price

adjustment or movement from one equilibrium to the other may
take a certain period of time to reach the new equilibrium.
Also, a commodity's quantity and price may be constrained
institutionally in many ways.

For instance, price ceilings

and floors, fixed prices, tariffs, or quota restrictions may
be imposed on a market by government, resulting in the
market's inability to achieve a competitive market
equilibrium.

A market disequilibrium occurs when quantity demanded
does not equal quantity supplied.

The assumption of market

equilibrium may be inappropriate if the demand or supply of
a commodity changes frequently, market adjustment is very
slow or impossible, or the movement of the price or quantity
is restricted.

Therefore, a market analysis needs to

distinguish the characteristics of market equilibrium from
those of disequilibrium.

Fisher (1983) suggests that the view of equilibrium
should rest logically on two underlying properties about the
dynamics of equilibrium.

First, the market system must be

convergent, or tending towards the equilibrium.

Second, the

movement or returning to the equilibrium state must take
place quickly so that the transient process of shifting from
one equilibrium to the other equilibrium may be ignored.
The requirements of an equilibrium system are thus
convergence and sufficient speed of the market adjustment
(Fisher, 1983).

Once the market reaches an equilibrium, the

equilibrium will then persist (Froyen and Greer, 1989).

Equilibrium of Virginia Market

A disequilibrium market system or non-convergent market
is often caused by constraints imposed by government or
institutions.

The constraints limit the movement of price

and quantity to achieve the market equilibrium or to reduce
the speed of the market adjustment (Maddala, 198 6).

There

are several regulations and laws in the Virginia oyster
industry which may affect the market equilibrium:
restrictions imposed by VMRC on public ground fishery such
as gear limitations, daily catch limits, and seasonal
closures.

Patent tongs and dredges are relatively efficient

compared to hand tongs, but since these gears may damage
oyster grounds, they have been restricted on certain public
grounds.

However, the number of patent tongs and dredges is

small compared to hand tongs, and they are used primarily on

the private grounds because of their efficiency (Insley,
1986).

The impact of gear limitations on production from

public ground fishery may thus seem to be small.

A daily catch limit of 15 bushels per person or 45
bushels per boat has been imposed by VMRC.

Insley (1986)

estimated that a three-person boat may yield 10 to 3 0
bushels of market oysters per day in Virginia public
grounds.

A report from the CEC (1989) also suggested that

the average catch per man-day was lower than the permitted
daily limits, meaning the daily catch limit probably does
not affect current production from public grounds.

Finally, the closure of the fishing season may affect
the oyster production of the public grounds, but the
seasonal closure limits the market itself rather than the
market adjustment.

As the market is subject to seasonal

closure, the market for public oysters does not exist.

The

study therefore assumes that the limitations of these
regulations and laws have little effect on the market
equilibrium for public oysters.

Alternatively, there are few regulations on taking
oysters from private leased grounds —

no catch, size, or

gear limitations, or seasonal closures on private oyster
production (JLARC, 1984).

Oyster supplies from private
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leased grounds may be year-round.

Also, few laws and

regulations exist for delivering oyster shellstock from
other regions to Virginia, except for the purpose of tax
collection, VMRC requires that oyster shippers provide a
shipping document detailing the costs, volume and source
areas.

It is reasonable to assume that each market sector

tends towards an equilibrium.

Harvesting oysters in public grounds and private leased
grounds may be daily activities.

The harvested market

oysters are transferred on the same day of their harvest to
the shucking houses (Insley, 1986).

The speed of the market

adjustment from outside supplies to Virginia shucking houses
is unclear.

However, the shellstock cannot be stored for

weeks without processing; the use of monthly data in the
study, therefore, should be sufficient to respond to the
market adjustment.

It is assumed that the market adjustment

of each sector in response to the change in the price is
reflected adequately in the monthly data, and that each
market sector is in equilibrium status.

Elasticity

Elasticity measures percentage changes in quantity or
price of goods in response to changes in factors affecting
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demand or supply.

The value of elasticity does not depend

on the units in which quantity, price, and other factors are
measured; rather, it is a dimensionless measure and
expressed as a relative percentage change.

The

sensitivities of goods to the buyers or sellers and the
market relationships between goods can be compared through
the use of elasticities.

Own-price Elasticity

Changes in quantity demanded and supplied depend upon
changes in the prices of the commodity.

The measurement of

the changes in the relationship between price and production
of a commodity is called the own-price elasticity of demand
or supply.

The own-price elasticity of demand or supply is

expressed as:

e =

(a Q /

a

P)

<P/Q)

(3.1)

where
e is the price elasticity of demand or supply,
Q is the quantity demanded or supplied of
P is the price of a commodity, and
a

is the symbol meaning "a change in".

a commodity,
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Given a mathematical relationship between quantity and
price,

a Q/a P

is equal to the partial derivative (dQ/dP)

demand or supply function.

of a

The own-price elasticity may

thus be obtained as follows:

e = (3Q/3P) (P/Q)

(3.2)

The own-price elasticity of demand is always negative
for a normal commodity because of the demand curve's
downward slope.

Conversely, the own-price elasticity of

supply is positive because of the upward slope of the supply
curve.

The magnitude of the own-price elasticity determines

the sensitivity of the commodity to the buyers or sellers.

The own-price elasticity of demand also indicates the
effect of a price change in the total amount spent on a
commodity.

However, the amount of money spent by buyers

equals the sellers7 revenue: the magnitude of the own-price
elasticity of demand thus has an important relationship to
the level of revenue (Table 8).

If the quantity demanded is

sensitive to the price change, or the own-price elasticity
of demand is greater than one, a small increase in price
will reduce the total revenue.

This is because the

percentage gain from the price increase is less than the
percentage lost to the quantity sold.

If the quantity

Table 8.

The relationship between own-price elasticity and
total revenue.

Own-price

Effect on Total Revenue of:

of Demand

Price Increase

Price Decrease

Price elastic

(|e |> 1)

Decrease

Increase

Unitary

(|ej = 1)

No change

No change

Price inelastic

(|e| < 1)

Increase

Decrease

Note:
|e| is the absolute value of own-price elasticity
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demanded is not sensitive to the price change, or own-price
elasticity of demand is less than one, an increase in price
will increase the total revenue.

If the own-price

elasticity equals one, a change in price will not affect
total revenue.

Cross-price Elasticity

A shift in the demand curve may be caused by a change
in other factors.

For instance, the demand for a commodity

may be affected by the prices of other related commodities.
If two commodities are closely related, it is possible that
one may substitute for the other.

If two commodities serve

the same purpose and are used together, changes in the
demand for one good will affect the demand for the other
good in the same direction.

It is also possible that two

commodities are unrelated to each other, and a change in the
demand for one good will not affect the demand for the
other.

The measurement of the market relationship of two

commodities is called the cross-price elasticity of demand,
defined as a rate of change in the quantity demanded of a
given commodity associated with a change in the price of
another commodity.

=

It may be expressed as

(AQx/ A P y) (P y /Q x)

(3.3)

where
e„y is the coefficient of cross-price elasticity of
commodity X with respect to a change in the price
of commodity Y,
Qx

is the quantity demanded of X, and

Py

is the price of Y.

The coefficient of cross-price elasticity, exy, can be
negative or positive.

If the cross-price elasticity is

positive, two commodities are substitutes.

An increase in

the price of Y will result in an increase in the demand for
commodity X.

If the cross-price elasticity of demand is

negative, two commodities are complements.

An increase in

the price of Y will result in a decrease in the demand for
X.

If the cross-price elasticity is close to zero, either

positive or negative, two commodities may be unrelated to
each other, and they are independent.

Economic Model for Virginia Oyster Market

Many factors affect the Virginia oyster market: its
complexity may be illustrated by a simplified economic flow
chart with price at the center of the market (Fig. 8).

For

instance, the demand for public and private oysters may be

Figure 8

Virginia oyster market flows
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affected by factors such as own price, prices of other
oysters, wholesale price, seasonal demand, and/or the
supplies from other regions.

Production from public ground

fishery may be affected by the ex-vessel price, fishing
season, the success of the ORP, and/or environmental
conditions such as water temperature and salinity.

The

production from private leased grounds is affected by its
own price, the quantity of previously planted seed oysters,
and environmental conditions.

The arrows on both ends of

the line represent market equilibrium.

This study proposes a complete Virginia oyster market
consisting of eight market relationships, with three demand
equations for the Virginia oyster market, including public
and private oysters and oyster supplies from other regions.
There are two supply equations, including public and private
oyster production, and finally, there are three
identifications for each market sector to complete the
system.

All relationships are assumed to be linear.

Demand for Oysters

Since the demand function for the Virginia oyster
market has not been identified, this study proposes demand
functions for each market sector as

Public:

Qdf

Private:

Qdp

Outside:

Qdo = F(Q sf /

=

F (P f,

F p/

F (P f,

Pp

djp I

Q jof

F wh ,

■ wh >

F wa,

^ l)

D.)

P w .)

(3 .4 )

(3 .5 )

(3 .6 )

where
Qdf

is the demand for oysters from public grounds,

Pf

is the oyster ex-vessel price or dockside price,
is the price paid to private planters,
is the quantity of supply from other regions,
is the wholesale price index in the Fulton market,
is the oyster ex-vessel price in the state of
Washington,

D,

is the seasonal demand dummy variable,

Qdp

is the demand for oysters from private leased
grounds,

Qdo

is the demand for oyster supplies from other
regions,

QJf

is the oyster supply from public grounds,

Qjp

is the oyster supply from private leased grounds,
and

Po

is the composite price index for other states.

The Virginia oyster processors7 demand for oysters from
public ground fishery and private leased grounds is assumed
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to be affected by the oyster ex-vessel price, price paid to
private planters, outside supplies, wholesale price index,
the oyster ex-vessel price in the state of Washington, and a
seasonal dummy variable.

Prior to 1986, records of monthly prices of oysters
transported from other states to the Virginia market were
not available from VMRC, but VMRC did maintain data on
monthly quantity supplied from other states.

The use of a

quantity variable in the demand function for the Virginia
oysters to measure a change in demand for oysters is
arguable.

However, over half of the unshucked oysters are

supplied from other regions, so it is impossible to ignore
this factor in modelling the Virginia oyster market.

March

(1985) has suggested that a quantity variable may be used in
the demand function; thus, the quantity supplied from other
states used in the estimation results from the lack of the
prices of oysters supplied by other states.

A consistent series of monthly wholesale prices for
Virginia oysters is also unavailable after 1984; instead, an
oyster wholesale price in Fulton, New York, is used as an
instrumental variable.

The shucked oysters are sold in the

Fulton market as half-pint, selects (210-3 00/gallon), extra
selects (160-210/gallon), and 100 count.

The wholesale

price index is a weighted price obtained by averaging the
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prices of selects and extra selects.

Pacific oysters differ both in taste and appearance
from the eastern oysters.

In the U.S., they are raised

primarily on the west coast.

Since Pacific oysters are also

brought into the Virginia market, this study considers that
the Pacific oyster may substitute for the eastern oyster.
Oyster ex-vessel price in the state of Washington is used as
the price of a substitute for the eastern oyster, because
the state of Washington is the largest producer of the
Pacific oyster in the nation.

Demand for oysters sharply increases during the
Thanksgiving and Christmas seasons because oysters are a
traditional food for these holidays (Haven et a l ., 1981;
Dressel et a l ., 1983).

A dummy variable is used to

represent the seasonal shifts in the demand for oysters; its
value will be given as one during these seasons, otherwise
as zero.

The demand function for outside supplies is assumed to
be affected by public and private production, the oyster
ex-vessel price in the state of Washington, and a composite
ex-vessel price index of other states.

Before 19 60, the

level of oyster shellstock from other states to Virginia was
negligible, because Virginia oyster production was able to

supply processors' demand (Insley, 1986).

The increase in

demand for oyster supplies from other states was caused by a
decrease in Virginia oyster production (Haven et al., 1981;
Insley, 1986; VIMS, 1989).

In addition, Haven et al. (1981)

state that Virginia oyster processors pay higher prices for
Maryland oysters than for Virginia oysters.

Based on

previous research, the demand for outside supply is unlikely
to be determined by Virginia oyster prices.

This study

considers that production from public and private leased
grounds will be independent variables in the demand function
for outside supplies.

Since large quantities of oyster shellstock are brought
from many states into Virginia oyster market, changes in the
ex-vessel prices or deck prices of oysters from these states
may affect the desires of Virginia oyster processors for
purchasing shellstock from these states.

There are 14

states trading in the Virginia market during the observed
periods: Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland (including the Potomac River), Missouri,
Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Texas.

If all prices are included in the demand function, the
degrees of freedom will be reduced, and there is likely to
be severe multicollinearity among the price variables

(Schrank et al ., 1988).

Since these prices may vary in the

same direction, a high correlation among the prices is
likely to occur; alternatively, focusing on only one state
introduces possible bias.

Econometric concept suggests an

aggregate price best reflects demand: the model thus
considers a composite index of the ex-vessel prices of other
states.

The composite ex-vessel price is formed by an

approximation to the Divisia aggregate:

Po = e

. - Pi*Qi
iBl

(3.7)

where s represents the number of states that sell their
oysters to Virginia.

Although oyster supplies from Missouri

are present in the records, they are unlikely to occur.

The

number of states used to construct the composite price index
is 13.

The state of Washington is not considered as one of

the outside oyster supplier because of lack of records.

It is hypothesized that the oyster prices have negative
effects on the quantity demand for public and private
oysters (Table 9), while the wholesale price index and
seasonal dummy variable may have positive effects on the
demand for public and private oysters.

Since the Pacific

Table 9.

The hypothesized signs of the coefficients
for the demand function.

Independent
Variable

Dependent Variable
Qdf

Pf

?»

Q dp

Q do

Negative

_b

pP

Negative

?

-

Q jo

Negative

Negative

-

Pwh

Positive

Positive

Pwa

Positive

Positive

D,

Positive

Positive

—

—

Negative

—

—

Negative

Qsr
Q.P
p0

Positive
—

Negative

Note:
* : the sign of coefficient is undetermined.
b : the variable is not included.

oysters are assumed to be substitutes for the eastern
oysters, the oyster ex-vessel price in the state of
Washington may have a positive effect on the demand for
public and private oysters.

Oysters from other states are

also assumed to be substitutes for oysters from public and
private leased grounds.

Therefore, oyster supply from other

regions may have a negative effect on the demand for public
ground fishery and private cultivated oysters, and
production from public and private leased grounds may have a
negative effect on the demand for outside oysters.

Finally,

the market relationship between public and private oysters
is undetermined.

Supplies of Ovsters

Fishery supply is often assumed to be exogenous because
it is affected predominantly by environmental and biological
factors (Lin, 1984; Wang, 1984), implying that fish
production will not be affected by its own-price.

However,

the assumption must assume simultaneously that the price
level is acceptable, given the quantity supplied of a
fishery product.

Otherwise, commercial fishery may not

exist without an acceptable price.

The latter assumption

implies that the price of the product is also exogenous.
Therefore, both the own-price and supply of a fishery
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product are exogenous.

The goal of a commercial fisherman is to make a profit,
a goal which relates to price and production.

The market is

thus determined simultaneously by production and price.

The

assumption of exogenous fish production resulting in an
price unrelated to production violates a fundamental
economic principle.

This study proposes oyster supply

functions for public and private oysters, even though data
on environmental and biological variables are limited.

In contrast, the outside supply is assumed to be
exogenous.

This assumption implies that outside production

is not influenced by the Virginia oyster market; therefore a
supply function for outside supply is not proposed in this
study.

The supply functions for public and private oysters

are specified as follows:

Public:

Q(f = F(Pf, MSX, D2)

(3.8)

Private:

Qjp = F(Pp, Seed,.16/ MSX)

(3.9)

where
is the dummy variable of the oyster fishing
season
MSX

is the MSX and "Dermo" diseases index, and
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Seed,.,6

is the production of seed oysters two years
prior to the present.

The supply function for public oysters, Equation 3.8,
assumes that oyster production from public grounds is
determined by its own price, a disease index, and a dummy
variable for fishing season.

Public production presents a

seasonal pattern: production is high at the beginning of the
fishing season and low at the end of the season.

The eight

months of oyster season are arbitrarily divided into two
categories, the early and the late oyster seasons.

The

values of the seasonal dummy variable will be given as one
for the first half of the oyster season and zero for the
later half.

MSX and "Dermo" still threaten the Virginia oyster
industry.

To monitor disease activity, the oyster

monitoring program at the Virginia Institute of Marine
Science has used water temperature and salinity as disease
indicators.

In general, a temperature and salinity higher

than the monthly average may indicate the threat of disease
(Burreson, 1987).

Monthly water temperature and stream flow data are used
to construct a disease indicator, MSX.

Data are

standardized initially by the monthly mean and deviation to

form an observed standard normal distribution with mean zero
and variance unity.

A negative value of flow represents a

smaller flow than the monthly average of stream flow in
terms of drought, while a positive value of water
temperature represents a higher temperature than the monthly
mean temperature.

Finally, the standardized temperature

data are subtracted from the stream flow data to form the
disease index.

A high water temperature and low flow will

produce a high value of MSX, indicating a higher risk of the
disease.

The supply function for private production assumes that
oyster production from private leased grounds is determined
by its price, seed oyster production of the previous two
years, and the disease index.

The production of seed

oysters has been used as an index of expected production
from leased bottoms two years later (Haven et al ., 1981).

A

two-year lag of seed oyster production is represented by 16
months, because there are four months of oyster season
closure for each year.

It is hypothesized that oyster prices have positive
effects on production in public ground fishery and private
leased grounds (Table 10) and that the disease indicator may
have a negative effect on both supply functions.

Finally,

Table 10.

Independent
Variable

The hypothesized signs of the coefficients
for the supply function.

Dependent Variable
Qsf

Qsp

Pf

Positive

MSX

Negative

Negative

d2

Positive

—

Pp
Seed,.16

— —

-

*

—

Positive
Positive

Note:
■ : the variable is not included.
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seed production may have a positive effect on private
production two years later.

Identity Equations

The study assumes that each market sector is in
equilibrium and that three identity equations for the market
equilibrium are necessary:

Qf = Qdf = Qsf

(3.10)

Qp = Qdp = Qsp

(3.11)

Qo = Qdo = Qso

(3.12)

where
Qf

is the production from public grounds,

Qp

is the production from private leased grounds,

Q0

is the quantity of oyster supply from other

and

states.

The identity equations state that the quantity demanded
is equal to the quantity supplied for each market sector,
based on the fact that the equilibrium of the Virginia
oyster market will be achieved via quick adjustment and
convergence.

These identity equations complete the Virginia
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oyster market system proposed in this study.

Simulation

A simulation is an experiment conducted with a
specially designed model of the system.

Simulation has been

widely used in many sciences to project the behavior of a
system given past and current information; it has also been
applied to an economic system when the analytical techniques
cannot perform controlled experiments.

The economic

simulation can be used for various purposes such as model
testing, forecasting, and policy analysis (Theil 1966;
Naylor, 1971).

The purpose of simulation in this study is to assess
the market behavior in response to the proposed objectives
of the OFMP, which are to initiate an improved oyster
fishery management and to achieve an optimum yield on a
long-term basis.

The primary objectives of the OFMP are to

increase both public ground fishery production to at least
700,000 bushels (20 percent above the ten-year average) by
1993 and privately cultivated oysters to 700,000 bushels
(the approximate twenty-year average) by 1995.

The annual

average of production is 380,000 bushels for public oysters
and 285,000 bushels for private oysters, meaning that the
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proposed public production by the OFMP is 1.8 times larger
than the observed annual public production, and the proposed
private production is 2.5 times larger than the observed
annual private production.

The market factors of the ex-vessel price, price paid
to oyster planters, and outside supply are simulated given
the estimated model and production proposed by the OFMP.
The proposed public and private production is assigned
proportionally to each month, based on the monthly mean of
production during the observed periods (1981-1989).

Monthly

mean of all exogenous variables will be used as input data.
The October values are used as the initial points.

Data

Data used in estimating market demand and supply were
obtained from a variety of sources.

All information related

to Virginia oyster production was from VMRC, and most
non-Virginia oyster-related information originated from the
Statistics Division of the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS).

Other data were obtained from various sources, such

as the Maryland Department of Natural Resources, the
Department of Fisheries of the state of Washington, and
Virginia Institute of Marine Science's published and

unpublished papers.

Monthly data from 1981 to 1989 were

used, except that for seed oysters, which were from 1979 to
1987.

Data Limitation

In Virginia, oyster price paid to oystermen may vary
based on the geographic location (Haven et a l ., 1981).
Prices are highest for oysters from the Rappahannock River,
less for the York River, and lowest for the Eastern Shore
oysters {JLARC, 1984).

However, there is no evidence that

the geographic variation of oyster prices is related to the
quality of oysters (Haven et al., 1981).

This study assumes

that the variation, if any, caused by the product
differentiation may be considered a minor effect.

The use

of aggregate production ignores the effect of product
differentiation on the geographic variation.

It is believed that the ORP has a positive effect on
the Virginia oyster industry (Haven, et a l ., 1981; Insley,
1986); however, Abbe (1988) suggests that the program may
have positive effects on sustaining good harvests only in
good spat set years (Abbe, 1988).

Unfortunately, the

effects of the ORP on Virginia oyster production have never
been confirmed by quantitative analysis because of data
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deficiency (JLARC, 1984; Thunberg and Santopietro, 1985;
Shabman and Thunberg, 1988).

Since the ORP data are formed

annually, the ORP will not be considered in the economic
model.

The state of Virginia prohibits harvesting oysters from
public grounds between June and September in order to
protect spawning stocks.

Since there is no public ground

fishery during these months, the data for public oyster
production and ex-vessel prices are zeroes.

The

interruption of public ground fishery by Virginia laws and
regulations creates two difficulties for the econometric
estimation: the zero observations in the data cannot be
considered as random samples, and the closure of the fishing
season results in a discontinuous data series.

Tobin (1958) analyzed household expenditure on durable
goods using a linear regression model.

He found that there

were no expenditures on certain durable goods when the
incomes were lower than a certain level.

This dependent

variable with a limited range of data is called a limited
dependent variable.

A limited dependent variable is part

qualitative (buy or not buy) and part quantitative (amount
bought) in terms of discrete and continuous data (Pindyck
and Rubinfeld, 1981), consequently an analysis of a limited
dependent variable combines analyses of qualitative and
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quantitative measures.

Both limited dependent variable and production from
public ground fishery consist of zeroes and non-zero data.
The fundamental difference between the zeroes in the limited
dependent variable and the production from public ground
fishery is the definition of the dependent variable.

The

zeroes in the limited dependent variable are caused by the
system itself because the decision to spend on the durable
goods is determined within the system, by consumers.

These

zeroes are regarded as random samples.

Conversely, a ban on public ground fishery from June to
September is imposed from outside the market system.

These

zeroes in public production cannot be interpreted as zero
landings because they imply that oystermen can harvest
oysters from public grounds.

These zeroes actually state

that oystermen cannot take oysters from public grounds at
all: the zero public production results from the regulations
rather than from the public ground fishery itself.
Therefore, the zero public production from public ground
fishery may not co-exist with other non-zero data.

A dummy variable is commonly used as a qualitative
factor, but adding a dummy variable as an independent
variable to indicate the closure of the fishing season is
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unlikely to solve the problem.

First, the dependent

variable still cannot satisfy the assumption of random
sampling if zeroes are included in the dependent variable.
Also, the dummy variable is likely to create a difficulty in
interpreting the closed season —

the result may have a

certain amount of estimated public oyster production between
June and September that should not be allowed.

As mentioned previously, the limited dependent variable
and the dummy variable addition methods violate relevant
assumptions.

Since there are no adequate methods to solve

the problem caused by oyster fishery regulations, a
redefined universe of data domain is considered.

As the

zero values of public production resulting from the seasonal
closure do not satisfy the econometric assumption, all data
from June to September are omitted.

This study considers

the Virginia oyster market in which only public ground
fishery exists.

There is no oyster supply from public

ground fishery, and therefore no market for public oysters
can exist.

The redefined data domain has no effect on the

public market sector.

The oyster supplies from other states are low during
the closed fishing season, ranging from 5 to 10 percent of
its annual supply (Table 11).

This study thus assumes that

Table 11.

Year

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

Percentage of total supplies of private and
outside Virginia in the closed fishing season
(June-September).

Private Supplies
Jun-Sep

Total

131308
94958
92527
62448
112537
186511
110140
62369
61352

368286
327139
312406
249681
317930
406535
273245
158205
155571

Data Source: VMRC.

Outside Supplies
%
0.36
0.29
0.30
0.25
0.35
0.46
0.40
0.39
0.39

Jun-Sep

Total

%

98675
65175
46381
66917
78750
55584
24644
26291
24307

1423193
1207739
895210
778636
821079
713700
481393
456063
478725

0.07
0 .05
0 .05
0 .09
0.10
0 .08
0 .05
0.06
0.05
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the seasonal closure has little impact on the outside market
sector and that the redefined data domain may have little
effect on it as well.

On the other hand, production from private leased
grounds during the seasonal closure is between 25 and 46
percent of its annual production.

The seasonal closure may

have a definite impact on private oyster production: the
redefined data domain will affect the private market sector,
and the analysis of private market sector is not completed.
Therefore, a supplemental model, incorporating all data, for
the private market sector is provided.

Methodology for the Analysis

This study has proposed that the Virginia oyster
shellstock market is comprised of the public ground fishery,
private oyster cultivation, and outside supplies.
market sector is assumed to be in equilibrium.

Each

Since the

market equilibrium is determined by the intersection of the
demand and supply curves, and each market sector is
interrelated to other sectors, a simultaneous multipleequations system is proposed.

In the linear regression model, the causal relationship
between the dependent variable (Y) and the independent
variables (Xs) is that Y is affected by X but not vice
versa.

However, the feedback from the dependent variable Y

to the independent variables Xs is likely to occur in the
market process; for instance, the quantity demanded or
supplied is simultaneously interdependent on the price.

A

system describing the joint dependence of variables is
called a system of simultaneous equations (Koutsyiannis,
1973) .

The simultaneous multiple-equations system is common in
market analysis because the market equilibrium is determined
simultaneously both by demand and supply functions.

Two

methods commonly used to estimate a simultaneous
multiple-equations system are Three-Stage Least Squares
(3SLS) and Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML).
These methods are concerned not only with the correlation
between the error term and some variables of the equation,
but also with the correlation of error terms across the
equations.

The techniques and their differences can be

found in Formby et al. (1988), Cramer (1986), Amemiya
(1985), Intriligator (1978), and Koutsoyiannis (1973).
estimation method used in this study is FIML.

The
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Estimation

Several statistical tests may be invalid for testing
the simultaneous multiple-equations system, such as the F
statistic and determination of coefficient or R 2 .

Ra, a

measure of the goodness of fit, is not bounded between zero
and one, but is bounded between negative infinity and one in
the simultaneous multiple-equations system.

A small value

of R 2 consequently may not be an indication of a poor fit
(Goldstein and Khan, 1978).

There are other criteria that measure the goodness of
fit.

The most popular alternatives are the Akaike

information, Amemiya's prediction, and the Schwarz criteria
(Kennedy, 1992).

After comparing several criteria, Amemiya

(1980) stated that "All of the criteria are based on
somewhat arbitrary assumptions which cannot be fully
justified...one can indefinitely go on inventing new
criteria," and as a result, this study will not provide
these criteria.

The statistic used to evaluate the fit of the model in
the FIML technique is the value of the log of likelihood
function, which measures the deviation of the observed data
and the fitted data in a log form.

A small number

represents a small deviation between samples and fitted data
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and hence indicates a better fit.

Alternatively, the F and R 2 also cannot be used to
examine the performance of the simulation, and the
Root-Mean-Square percentage error (RMS %) will be used as a
criterion of the simulation analysis instead.

The RMS %

measures the sum of square of the percentage difference
between the observations and the simulated data in squared
root (Pindyck and Rubinfeld. 1981).

A large value of the

RMS % represents a great deviation between the observations
and simulated data.

RMS % -

The RMS % is defined as

i

1

i V

N

yP_y°

(— £

£.)2

(3.18)

x?

where
Yp is the simulated or predicted endogenous variable,
Y° is the observed endogenous variable, and
T

is the number of data or periods in the simulation.

All estimation and tests will be performed using
Soritec PC version 6.5.
will be used.

The convergence criterion of 0.001

Each estimated parameter will be examined by

a t-statistic at the five percent level of significance.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Estimation and Empirical Results

Estimation is complicated by the presence of
multicollinearity and by serial correlation among some
variables.

Multicollinearity results in the problem that

the estimates of the ordinary least squares (OLS) method may
be inefficient, and statistical tests of the significance of
the estimates tend not to reject the null hypothesis
(Intriligator, 1978; Koutsoyiannis, 1973).

There are many options for dealing with
multicollinearity: adding more non-correlated data, dropping
one of the collinear variables, aggregating the collinear
variables, or using the principal component and ridge
techniques (Kennedy, 1992).

The occurrence of

multicollinearity depends upon the data set at hand (Kmenta,
1971).

Since multicollinearity is not caused by model

misspecification, a change in the model structure or
techniques may be inappropriate in many situations
(Blanchard, 1987; Conlisk, 1971; Maddala, 1988).
Alternatively, Blanchard (1987) suggests that the problem of
73
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multicollinearity may not be severe and may in fact be
ignored if the t-statistics of the correlated variables are
all greater than two.

The Virginia oyster ex-vessel price and the price paid
to private planters were highly correlated; the correlation
coefficient was 0.8,

Since both prices were included in the

demand functions for Virginia oysters, multicollinearity
would pose a problem for estimation.

However, a t-value for

the difference between ex-vessel price and price paid to
private oyster planters was 11.2, which indicated that both
prices might have a different population distribution.
Also, the estimated coefficients for both prices were
significantly different than zero, suggesting that the
problems of multicollinearity in the model could be
tolerated.

Serial correlation occurs when the error term for one
observation is related to the error term for another
(Kennedy, 1992).

Since the error terms are not temporally

independent, the estimates of the OLS are also inefficient:
if positive serial correlation occurs, the problem for the
estimated model is that variance of the estimated parameters
may be underestimated.

The Durbin-Watson (DW) test has been widely used for

testing first order serial correlation.

The value of the DW

statistic, ranging from 0 to 4, falls into one of three
classifications: serial correlation, no serial correlation,
and inconclusive.

If the DW is close to 2, there is no

serial correlation within the observed data; if the DW is
close to zero or 4, the samples are likely to have a strong
positive or negative serial correlation.

Also, there is an

indeterminate or inclusive region between the no serial
correlation and the strong serial correlation regions.

For

the simultaneous multiple-equations system with the problem
of serial correlation, Goldfeld and Quandt (1972) suggest
that the estimates from the nonlinear FIML method are more
efficient than estimates from other methods.

The DW statistic indicated that first order serial
correlation existed in all equations, except the demand
function for private production.

The original model was

therefore transformed in order to incorporate the
coefficient of serial correlation into the model (Table 12).
A non-linear FIML method was then applied to the transformed
model and estimated.

Convergence of the FIML procedure did not occur in the
early analysis.
the samples —

This might be attributable to the nature of
in the collected data, the production

Table 12.

Qfit

The transformed econometric model.

= a (1-pi) +aj (Pflt-Pi*Pfln) +a2(Pp>t-p1*Pp>w)+a3(Q0.rPj*Q0l,-i)+
a4(Pwh,t“Pt*Pwh,t-l)+a5(Pw*,t”Pl*Pwa,t-l) +a6(Dlt”Pi*Dl,_i) “Pi*Qf,t-l

QP

= b+b,*Pf+b2*Pp+b3*Q0+b4*Pwh+bs*Pw,+b6*Dl)

Qo,t =

C ( 1 “ P 3) +C, (Qf, ” P 3*Qf,t.l ) + C 2 {Qp,rP3*Qp,t.l) + C 3 (Poi,t” P3* Po.,t-l ) +
( P w a ,t“ ^ ~ ^ * w a ,l- l ) “ P 3 * Q o , t - l

Q f ,t

= d(l-p4)+d1(Pfirp4*Pf,t.1)+d2(MSXr p4*MSXl.1)+d3(D2t-p4*D2l.1)
P 4 * Q f.t-l

Q Pl.

=

e ( l - p 5 ) + e | ( P P ,t“ P 5 * P p , t . l ) + e 2 ( S E E D M 6 " P 5 * S E E D l - 1 7 ) +

e3(MSXl-pJ*MSX,.1)-P5*Qp>14

where
Qf
Pf
Qp
Pp
Qc
Pwh
Pwa
D1
P0J
MSX
D2
SEED,.16
p
a - e
t-l

is
is
is
is
is
is
is

oyster production from public grounds,
the oyster ex-vessel price or dockside price,
oyster production from private leased grounds,
the price paid to private planters,
the supplies from other regions,
the wholesale price index in Fulton market,
the oyster ex-vessel price in the state of
Washington,
is the seasonal demand dummy variable,
is the composite price index for other states.
is the MSX and "Dermo" diseases index,
is the dummy variable of oyster fishing season,
is production of seed oysters two years prior to
the present,
is the serial correlation coefficients,
are the parameters to be estimated, and
is the variable lagged one period.
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variables consisted of large values, and the price and index
variables of small values.

The econometric package PC

version by Soritec, Inc. may not deal well with this
situation.

Since the criterion had been set at 0.001,

increasing the number of iteration was necessary to achieve
convergence.

Convergence finally occurred after 299

iterations, and the value of the log of likelihood function
was -2218.

In contrast, the supplemental model for private

market converged quickly after 15 iterations, and the value
of the log of likelihood function was -1114.

Demand for Oysters

All estimated coefficients of the demand function for
public oysters were significantly different from zero at the
5 percent level of significance (Table 13).

Thus, a change

in any of the factors would have a significant influence on
the demand for public oysters.

The DW statistic was 1.55,

indicating that serial correlation was uncertain.

A negative coefficient for ex-vessel price suggested
that price had a negative effect on the quantity demanded.
A dollar increase in ex-vessel price would decrease the
quantity demanded for public oysters by 2 3 thousand bushels.

Table 13.

Parameter estimates for the demand function for
public oysters.

Variable

Coefficient

Constant
Pf
Pp
Qjo
Pwh
pw»
D1

4847.14
-23154.30
-8711.41
3.12
7163.34
-795.58
4554.41

Pi
DWC

Standard Dev.

**
**
**
**
**
*b

0.41 **
1.55

Elasticity

58.05
5129.21
1917.10
0.44
2016.41
162.99
1800.29

-6.48
-4 .21
-0.02

0. 03

Note:
* - Significantly different from zero at the one percent
level.
b - Significantly different from zero at the five percent
level.
e - Durbin-Watson statistic.

«

79
The own-price elasticity, evaluated at mean values, -6.48,
indicated also that demand for public oysters was highly
elastic.

A change in ex-vessel price would have a large

effect on the demand for public production.

The price paid to private planters was found to have a
negative effect on the demand for public oysters.

A dollar

increase in the price paid to private planters would
decrease demand for public oysters by about eight thousand
bushels.

The negative coefficient implied that oysters from

private leased grounds were complementary to oysters from
public grounds.

Demand for oysters from public grounds was

highly responsive to changes in the price paid to private
planters, indicated by a cross-price elasticity of -4.21.

The coefficient for outside supply was positive, which
contradicted the prior hypothesis that outside supplies were
substitutes for oysters from public grounds and had a
negative effect on the demand for public oysters.

The

interpretation that an increase in one bushel of oysters
supplied from outside would increase the demand for public
production by three bushels was paradoxical.

A positive sign for the wholesale price index suggested
that the wholesale price in the Fulton market had a positive
effect on Virginia oyster processors7 demand for public

production.

An increase in the wholesale price would

encourage oyster processors to buy more public oysters.

The

seasonal dummy variable also had a positive coefficient:
during the Thanksgiving and Christmas seasons, the demand
for public oysters increased 4.6 thousand bushels more than
during the rest of the seasons.

The coefficient for the oyster ex-vessel price in the
state of Washington was negative, contradicting prior
substitution expectation.

A negative coefficient suggested

that oysters from the state of Washington were complementary
to oysters from public grounds.

A dollar increase in the

oyster ex-vessel price of Washington may decrease the demand
for public oysters by 800 bushels.

The cross-price

elasticity, however, was relatively small (0.02).

However,

a one-hundred percent increase in the oyster ex-vessel price
of Washington would reduce demand for public oysters by only
two percent.

All estimated coefficients of the demand function for
private oysters were significantly different than zero
(Table 14-a), and all signs of coefficients in the demand
function for private oysters were the same as the demand
function for public, except the oyster ex-vessel price in
the state of Washington.

A positive coefficient for outside

Table 14-a.

Variable
Constant

Parameters estimate for the demand function
for private oysters.

Coefficient

Pf
Pp
Qso
Pwh
pwa
D1

12833,80
-1785.55
-1570.74
0.10
1090.79
4545.00
1791.59

DW*

1.55

**a
*b
**
**
**
**
**

Standard Dev.
930.03
771.22
434.98
0 . 03
248.40
936.57
669.79

Elasticity

-0.5
-0.76

0.19

Note:
* - Significantly different from zero at the one percent
level.
b - Significantly different from zero at the five percent
level.
c - Durbin-Watson statistic.

Table 14-b.

Variable
Constant
Pf
Pp
Qso
Pwh
P\VB
D1
DW*

Parameters estimate for the demand function
for private oysters".

Coefficient
10191.10
-1401.33
-1650.52
0.06
1158.58
94.82
985.24

**b
**
**
**
**
**

Standard Dev.

Elasticity

1.635
13.739
14.011
0.021
46.985
1. 696
1.004

-0. 74

0.84

Note:
" - The estimation includes June - September data.
b - Significantly different from zero at the one percent
level.
c - Durbin-Watson statistic.
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supply which contradicted the expectation was also found for
the demand function for private oysters.

The DW statistic

of 1.55 indicated that serial correlation was indeterminate.

The coefficient for the ex-vessel price was negative,
suggesting that oysters from public grounds were also
complementary to oysters from private leased grounds.

Since

oysters from both public and private leased grounds are
complements, an increase in the price of one would decrease
the demand for the other.

However, a small cross-price

elasticity indicated that the demand for private was not
very sensitive to the ex-vessel price.

A one percent

increase in ex-vessel price would decrease the demand for
private oysters by 0.5 percent.

The coefficient for the price paid to private oyster
planters was negative, which confirmed the assumption that
price had a negative impact on quantity demanded.

A dollar

increase in price paid to private planters would decrease
the demand for private oysters by 1.5 thousand bushels;
however, the own-price elasticity suggested that the demand
for private oysters was not sensitive to its own-price.
the price paid to private planters was increased by one
percent, the demand for private oysters would decrease by
0.76 percent.

If
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Estimated coefficients for the wholesale price index
and the dummy variable were positive: an increase in oyster
wholesale price in Fulton market would increase the Virginia
processors' demand for private oysters.

Demand for private

oysters would also increase during the Thanksgiving and
Christmas seasons.

However, the amount of increase in the

demand for private oysters was not as large as that for
public oysters.

The coefficient for the oyster ex-vessel price in the
state of Washington oysters was positive, suggesting that
the Pacific oyster was a substitute for the Virginia oyster
from private leased grounds.

The small cross-price

elasticity, 0.19, suggested that demand for private oysters
was not very sensitive to the oyster ex-vessel price of the
Washington oysters —

a ten-percent increase in the oyster

ex-vessel price in Washington would increase the demand for
private oysters by only two percent.

All signs of coefficients in the supplemental demand
function for private oysters, including information between
June and September, were the same as in the original model
(Table 14-b).

The demand for private oysters was also

inelastic at 0.74.

However, the coefficient for outside

supplies was no longer statistically significant, since the
DW statistic was 0.84, indicating the occurrence of serial
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correlation of the model.

All estimated coefficients of the demand function for
outside supplies were significantly different than zero
(Table 15), meaning that a change in any of the factors
would have a significant influence on the demand for outside
supply.

These estimated parameters might be biased since

the demand function was missing a relevant variable, the
price for outside supply.

The DW statistic was 1.58, which

indicated that serial correlation was uncertain.

The coefficient for private production was negative,
which indicated that oysters from private leased grounds
were substitutes for outside supplies.

An increase in

private production would decrease the demand for outside
supply.

Alternatively, the coefficient for public

production was positive.

The negative coefficient

contradicted the prior hypothesis that public production had
a negative effect on the demand for outside supplies.

A positive coefficient for the composite ex-vessel
price index was also contrary to prior expectations,
suggesting that an increase in the ex-vessel price in other
states would increase processors' demand for outside
supplies.

A negative coefficient of the oyster ex-vessel

Table 15.

Parameter estimates for the demand function for
outside supplies.

Variable

Coefficient

Constant
Qf
QP
p0

16455.5
0.4
-0.5
12260.7
-10927.7

P wa

Pi t
DW

**
**
**
**

-0.37**
1. 58

Standard Dev.
1014.20
0.07
0.14
2539.04
2095.20

Elasticity

-0.11

0.04

Note:
" - Significantly different from zero at the one percent
level.
b - Durbin-Watson statistic.
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price in the state of Washington was found in the demand
function for outside supply, making Pacific oysters
complementary to oysters from other regions.

The demand for

outside supplies was still not very sensitive to the oyster
ex-vessel price in the state of Washington because of the
small cross-price elasticity: a ten percent increase in the
oyster ex-vessel price in the state of Washington would only
increase the demand for outside supply by 1.1 percent.

Supplies of Oysters

The study assumed that the ex-vessel price, disease
index, and seasonal changes were the most important factors
for the public supply function, but the statistical results
indicated that only the seasonal variable was important to
oyster production from public grounds (Table 16).

The DW

statistic was 1.9 for the public supply function, which
indicated no serial correlation in the transformed supply
function.

A positive coefficient for the ex-vessel price
confirmed the hypothesis that price had a positive effect on
the quantity supplied.

However, the coefficient of

ex-vessel price was not significantly different than zero at

Table 16.

Variable
constant
Pf
MSX
D2

Pi
DWb

Parameter estimates for the supply function for
public oysters.

Coefficient
6143.99 **a
87 .06
2234.28
21065.00 **
-0.43 **
1.90

Standard Dev.
409.48
225.24
1320.27
731.01

Elasticity

0.02

0.60

Note:
* - Significantly different from zero at the one percent
level.
b - Durbin-Watson statistic.
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the 5 percent level of significance, and the own-price
elastic of supply was relatively small as well (0.02).
These suggested that the ex-vessel price within the observed
ranges was not an important determinant for public
production.

The coefficient for the disease index was positive but
not significantly different from zero, meaning the factor of
diseases was not important to public production during the
observed periods.

This contradicted the previous assumption

that disease was one of the most important factors causing a
decrease in Virginia oyster production.

Conversely, the

coefficient for the seasonal variable was positive and
statistically significant.

Oysters production from public

grounds was determined primarily by the season: supply from
public grounds was 21,000 bushels higher in the early
fishing season than in the late.

The supply function for private oysters was assumed to
be determined by the price paid to private planters, seed
oyster production, and the disease index.

Production of

seed oysters was assumed to have positive effect on private
production two years later.

The DW statistic was 1.91,

showing no serial correlation in the transformed supply
function (Table 17-a).

Table 17-a.

Variable
Constant
Pp
SeeH6
MSX

DWb

Parameter estimates for the supply function
for private oysters.

Coefficient
9285.23 **■
25523.90 **
-0.01
3202.82 **
0.87 **
1.91

Standard Dev.
141.99
5509.53
0.09
688.50

Elasticity

12 .35

0.04

Note:
* - Significantly different from zero at the one percent
level.
b - Durbin-Watson statistic.

Table 17-b.

Variable
Constant
Pp
See«.i6
MSX
Pa
DW®

Parameter estimates for the supply function
for private oysters*.

Coefficient
8639.06 **b
21258.20 **
-0. 24
-2525.19 **
0.83 **
1.7

Standard Dev.

Elasticity

1.00001
1.02972
0.15488
1.00180

9.53

0.02

Note:
* - The estimation includes June - September data.
b - Significantly different from zero at the one percent
level.
c - Durbin-Watson statistic.
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The price paid to private planters had a positive
coefficient.

Oyster production from private leased grounds

was sensitive to its price because of the high own-price
elasticity of supply.

A one percent increase in the price

paid to private planters would increase oyster production
from private leased grounds by 12.35 percent.

The negative coefficient for seed oyster production
confounded prior expectations, but the coefficient was not
significantly different from zero —

production of seed

oysters was not important to private production.

The

negative coefficient for seed oyster production may be
caused by large mortality because of disease in the private
sector during the observed periods.

The disease index had a

positive coefficient, also contrary to the hypothesis that
disease negatively affects private production.

All signs of coefficients in the supplemental supply
function for private oysters, including information between
June and September, were the same as in the original supply
model, except for the coefficient for MSX index (Table 17b).

A significantly negative sign of coefficient for

disease index suggested that disease had negative impact on
private production.
elastic.

The supply of private oysters was also
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Discussion

Empirical results suggested several conclusions
contrary to prior expectations.

First, the estimated supply

functions for public and private oysters had positive signs
for the disease index.

A higher value of the index

indicated a higher risk of the disease.

However, the

occurrence of diseases was triggered by many thresholds:
water temperature, salinity, and time of incubation.

For

instance, the mortality of "Dermo" was largely found in
oysters from two to four years old, and disease was
eliminated during the winter season.

Also, the water

temperature and salinity were related to the growth of
oysters: a high temperature or high salinity would have a
positive effect on oyster growth.

The coefficient for the disease index was negative and
significantly different from zero in the supplemental model.
The significantly negative coefficient suggested that
disease was an important factor for private production.

The

different results of the supplemental and original private
supply functions were caused by the included or excluded
information in the closed fishing season.

High disease

mortality occurred during the closed fishing season because
of high water temperature; excluding information between

94
June and September thus underestimated the prevalence of
diseases.

Therefore, the positive coefficient for the

disease index in public and private supply functions might
indicate growth of oysters and not disease occurrence.

A positive coefficient for the composite ex-vessel
price index variable in the estimated demand function for
outside supply indicated that an increase in the price of
oysters from other states would increase Virginia
processors' demand for outside supplies.

The positive

coefficient occurred if an increase in the oyster ex-vessel
price in other states was caused by the increase in the
total demand for eastern oysters.

It was also possible that

estimates of demand function for outside supply were biased
as a result of the excluded price paid to outside supply.
Lacking adequate information, the cause of the positive
coefficient for the composite ex-vessel price could not be
concluded.

Market Equilibrium for Public Ovsters

The estimated demand and supply functions for public
oysters indicated that the market equilibrium for public
ground fishery consisted of an elastic demand and a very
inelastic supply.

If public production increased, the
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supply curve shifted to the right; if the demand for public
oysters was held constant, the equilibrium would shift down
and to the right.

The shift in supply curve resulted in a

decrease in the ex-vessel price and an increase in the
quantity demanded for public oysters.

since the demand for

public oysters was elastic, an increase in public production
would be likely to increase the total revenue for public
ground fishery.

The supply curve shifted instead to the left if oyster
production from public grounds was decreased further.

The

equilibrium would shift up and to the left if the demand for
public oysters was held constant.

The shift in the supply

curve caused an increase in the ex-vessel price and a
decrease in the quantity demanded.

Therefore, a continuous

decline in public production would decrease the total
revenue for public ground fishery.

The estimated demand and supply functions for public
also indicated that the market for public oysters was
seasonal, with a relatively high demand for public oysters
occurring during the Thanksgiving and Christmas seasons
along with a relatively high supply from public grounds,
causing both demand and supply curves to shift seasonally.
Since the market for public oysters consisted of an elastic
demand and a very inelastic supply, the seasonal shifts in
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the public oyster market would yield higher total revenue in
the early season than in the late.

Market Equilibrium for Private Oysters

There was little difference in two private market
sectors: included and excluded June-September data.

Both

models indicated that the market equilibrium for private
oysters was determined by an inelastic demand and a highly
elastic supply.

If private production increased, the supply

curve would shift to the right, causing a decrease in the
price paid to private planters if the demand for private
oysters was held constant.

Since the demand for private

oysters was inelastic, an increase in private production
would decrease the total revenue for private planters.
Alternatively, a decrease in private production was likely
to increase the total revenue for the private oyster
industry.

Alternatively, if the demand for private oysters
increased, the demand curve shifted to the right.

The shift

in demand oysters would increase not only the price but also
production if the supply curve was held constant, indicating
that increase in the demand for private production would
increase the total revenue for private oyster planters.
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The structure of market equilibrium for private
oysters, consisting of inelastic demand and elastic supply,
was opposite to the public market.

In the public market

sector, production from public ground fishery increased as
demand for oysters was high, and production decreased as
demand was low (Fig. 9).

In contrast, production from

private leased grounds decreased as the price rose and
production increased as price dropped (Fig. 10).

The difference of market structure between public and
private oysters was based on a lower price for private
oysters than the ex-vessel price during the observed
periods.

This phenomenon suggested that private oyster

growers had less costs than oystermen, but this was
questionable.

Some private oyster planters also owned

oyster processing houses, which possibly resulted in a low
price paid to private oyster planters.

Therefore, the

quantity demanded and supplied of oysters from private
leased grounds might represent processors' needs and not be
the real market demand.

Market Relationships among Oysters

A shift in market equilibrium was caused not only by

Figure 9

Monthly production and price of public ground fishery.
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Monthly production and price for private oysters.
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changes in price and production of a commodity but also by
changes in price and production of related commodities.
Consequently, each market sector was affected by the other
sectors: the market relationships among various oysters from
different sources were determined by the cross-price
elasticity.

Oysters from public ground fishery and private leased
grounds were complements: an increase in the price of one
would decrease the quantity demanded for both oysters.
Oysters from public ground fishery and outside supplies were
also complements.

However, oysters from private leased

grounds and outside supplies were substitutes.

An increase

in the price paid to private oyster planters would increase
the demand for outside supplies.

In general, the market relationship between Pacific and
eastern oysters was weak because of the small values of
cross-price elasticities.

Pacific oysters were substitutes

for oysters from private leased grounds, complements for
outside supply, and independent goods for oysters from
public grounds —

oysters from private leased grounds and

the Pacific oysters would compete with each other in the
Virginia oyster market.

An increase in the oyster ex-vessel

price of Washington would likely increase the demand for
private oysters.
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On the other hand, an increase in the oyster ex-vessel
price in the state of Washington would decrease the demand
for outside supplies.

The demand for public oysters was

unlikely to be affected by the changes in the oyster
ex-vessel prices of Washington.

The results of the model indicated that most market
relationships among oysters were complementary (Table 18).
Since the demand for oysters was related to the seasons, the
study suggested that the complementary relationships among
oysters were caused by the seasonal demand.

The Ex-vessel Price

Production from public grounds was not affected by the
ex-vessel price, as indicated by the statistically
insignificant coefficient.

From an economic point of view,

an irrelevant price indicates that the supply curve is
vertical to the X axis and has a zero elasticity of supply,
or a perfectly inelastic supply.

The perfect inelasticity

of supply usually occurs in a very short market period
(Bronfenbrenner et al., 1986).

In the very short market

period, the supply of a commodity in the market is fixed
because the time period is too short to produce or transport

Table 18.

The relationships among oysters from different
sources.

Oysters from
Market Demand
for
Public Oysters

Public
—

Private Oysters

Cc

Outside supply

c

Note:
4 - no estimation.
b - Independent.
c - Complements.
d - Substitutes.

Private

Outside

C

C

-----

C

s

------

Washington

sd
c
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any amount of the commodity into the market; thus the supply
of a commodity cannot be affected by changes in its own
price.

However, the market period used in the study was
assumed to be sufficient for the market adjustment.
Harvested oysters would reach the market in a short period,
so the unrelated ex-vessel price to public production was
not caused by the market period.

The insignificant

coefficient for the ex-vessel price implied that stock
levels were limited (Smith and Peterson, 1979; Kirkley,
1986).

As the ex-vessel price increased, it was impossible

to increase oyster production given the current oyster stock
and fishing effort.

Since Virginia laws and regulations

were inadequate to manage oyster stocks, the study suggested
that the ex-vessel price unrelated to public production
occurred because of limited stocks on public grounds.

PRICE, REVENUE, AND OYSTER MANAGEMENT

Simulation

As suggested previously, as the demand or supply of
Virginia oysters was changed the market equilibrium of
Virginia oysters would shift.

Since the demand for Virginia

oysters was related to that for other oysters, changes in
the demand or supply of other oysters would also affect the
Virginia oyster market.

The purpose of the simulation was

to analyze such impacts.

The simulation was based on the market equilibrium
given an estimated economic system, but the process also
involved shifts in the market equilibrium; for instance, the
ex-vessel price was simulated through the entire oyster
season.

The simulation process thus included changes not

only in oyster production and prices but also in the
seasonal demand.

The observed mean of the ex-vessel price and price paid
to private planters was considered as only one base.

The

simulation of the experiments was classed into two groups:
104
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the first based on the observed production level, the other
on the OFMP proposed level (Table 19).

In Group One, there were five experiments:
success of the OFMP,

(1) the

(2) the failure of the OFMP,

continuous decline in current production,

(3) a

(4) a decrease in

the ex-vessel price of Washington oysters, and (5) an
increase in the demand for outside supplies.

A 50 percent

increase in the observed mean of public and private
production was assumed given that the OFMP improved Virginia
oyster production but did not achieve its goal.
Alternatively, a decline in oyster production would continue
if VMRC could not reverse the current downward trend.

A 50

percent decrease in the observed public and private
production was proposed.

Oyster production in the state of Washington increased
over the periods.

A decrease in the ex-vessel price of

Washington oysters would occur if the demand for Pacific
oysters was held constant; therefore, a 20 percent decrease
in the oyster ex-vessel price of Washington was assumed.
the other hand, the demand for outside supplies would
increase if the ex-vessel price in other states was
decreased due to the increase in production; a 20 percent
increase in the demand for outside supplies was assumed.

On

Table 19.

Group

The experiments of simulation

Experiment
1. An increase in the observed production to the
OFMP proposed level
2. An increase in the observed production by 50
percent

One

3. An decrease in the observed production by 50
percent
4. A decrease in the ex-vessel price of Washington
oysters by 20 percent
5. An increase in the demand for outside supply by
20 percent
1. An increase in the observed production to the
OFMP proposed level

Two

2. A decrease in the oyster ex-vessel price of
Washington by 20 percent
3. An increase in outside supply by 20 percent

Others

1. An increase in the observed private production
by 50 percent
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In addition to the success of the OFMP, there were two
experiments in Group Two: a decrease in the ex-vessel price
of Washington oysters and an increase in the demand for
outside supplies while Virginia production increased
simultaneously to the OFMP proposed level.

Group Two's

simulation was based on the success of the OFMP, and its
experiments would analyze the impacts of the OFMP on the
demand or supply of oysters from other areas.

In addition, there was an experiment increasing only
private production.

Because the market relationship between

private oysters and outside supplies was not clear in the
previous analysis, the experiment was necessary to determine
the effect of private oysters on outside supplies.

All given values of percentage in the experiments were
arbitrary.

All experiments in Group One were compared to

the base; in Group Two, all experiments were compared to the
simulated OFMP.

Simulation on Group One
Price and Revenue for Public Oysters

The results of simulation on the ex-vessel price were
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mixed compared to the base one (Fig. 11-a).

If Virginia

oyster production was increased as the first and second
scenarios assumed, the ex-vessel price would increase and
then decrease.

If oyster production decreased as assumed

experiment 3, the ex-vessel price decreased in the late
season.

The ex-vessel price fell sharply during the late
season, particularly in the experiment on the success of the
OFMP.

The reduction of ex-vessel price was caused primarily

by a large increase in total production: proposed public
production was 1.85 times larger than observed public
production, and proposed private production was 2.45 times
larger than observed private production.

As previously

indicated, the demand for public oysters was low during the
later season, so it was possible that a large scale of
increase in oyster production might result in a very low
ex-vessel.

Conversely, an increase in the ex-vessel price in
November and December should not be interpreted as a
positive slope of the demand curve for public oysters during
these months.
equilibrium.

The model simulation was based on the market
An increase in the supply implied that the

demand for oysters also increased; the market equilibrium

Figure 11

Price and revenue simulations for public oysters.
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for the scenarios one and two would have a higher demand for
public oysters than the base.

For such high demand in the

early season, the proposed production could not satisfy the
demand; for instance, a 50 percent increase in Virginia
oyster production could not reduce the ex-vessel price of
November and December, which was reduced as production
increased to the OFMP proposed level.

In general, an increase in the demand for outside
supply decreased the ex-vessel price, indicating that
oysters from other regions were complementary to public
oysters, but a decrease in the ex-vessel price of Washington
oysters did not have a consistent effect on the ex-vessel
price.

This suggested that Pacific oysters and oysters from

public ground fishery were independent goods.

As Virginia oyster production increased, the total
revenue for public ground fishery also increased, except
during April and May (Fig. 11-b).

A large increase in the

total revenue in the early season resulted from an increase
in the demand and supply of public oysters, and a negative
revenue in the late season resulted from a large decrease in
the ex-vessel price.

The results of simulation indicated

that the total revenue would decrease if Virginia oyster
production continuously declined.
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As the ex-vessel price of Washington oysters was
decreased by 20 percent, or the demand for outside supply
increased by 20 percent, changes in the total revenue for
public ground fishery were negligible.

These indicated that

the market relationships among public oysters, oysters from
other regions, and Pacific oysters were weak.

Thus, changes

in the demand or supply for outside supplies and Pacific
oysters would have little effect on the total revenue for
public ground fishery.

Price and Revenue for Private Oysters

In most experiments, the prices paid to private
planters were higher than the base (Fig. 12-a).

A lower

observed price was expected because many oyster processors
were also oyster growers.

As total production increased,

the price paid to private planters increased, higher in the
late season than the early season.

This study suggested

that the price paid to private planters might not be the
market price.

Also, the increase in oyster production might

result from the increased demand.

Therefore, an increase in

production would elevate the price.

The total revenue for the private oyster industry

Figure 12

Price and revenue simulations for private oysters.
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increased as Virginia oyster production increased (Fig.
12-b).

The increase in the total revenue resulted from the

increases in price and production, but the total revenue
would decrease if production fell.

Changes in demand or

supply of Washington oysters and outside supplies would
slightly affect the total revenue for private oyster
industry in later season.

Oyster Supplies from Other Regions

The results of simulation indicated that demand for
outside supplies would increase if Virginia oyster
production increased (Fig, 13).

The increase in outside

supply resulted from the increase in public production,
because oysters from public grounds were complementary to
oysters from other regions.

A decrease in the ex-vessel price of Washington oysters
did not have consistent impact on the outside supplies,
suggesting that Pacific oysters were independent of outside
supplies.

Finally, an increase in private production only

decreased the demand for outside supplies in the early
season.

Oysters from private leased grounds would thus be

substitutes for outside supplies when the demand for outside
supplies was high.

Figure 13

Simulation on oyster from other regions.
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Simulation on Group Two

The results of the model indicated that changes in the
demand for outside supplies or supply of Washington oysters
or public oysters had little effect on both public ground
fishery and private production (Fig. 14 and 15).

This

suggested that the market relationships between Virginia
oysters and outside supply and Pacific oyster were weak.
Virginia oyster production increased to the OFMP proposed
levels, a 2 0 percent decrease in the ex-vessel price of
Washington oysters or 20 percent increase in the outside
supplies would have little impact on the total revenue of
Virginia oyster industry.

Virginia oyster Market and Management
Virginia Public Ground Fishery

As demonstrated previously, the ex-vessel price was
unrelated to public production and the low oyster CPUE
suggests that current oyster stocks in "the public grounds
are limited.

The results of the model suggest that

regulations to limit fishing effort are necessary to
maintain and increase stock levels.

Also, the results of

simulation indicate that most total revenue for public

As

Figure 14

Price and revenue simulations for public oysters.
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Price and revenue simulations for private oysters.
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ground fishery will increase if Virginia oyster production
increases.

Any improvement of production from public

grounds will benefit the public oyster industry.

However, model simulation indicates that the effects of
production proposed by the OFMP on the Virginia oyster
market are affected by the seasonal demand.

Also, the rate

of net percentage increase in the total revenue is
relatively small in the late season (Table 20).

These may

provide two implications for oyster management strategies;
first, oyster season may be shortened, ending in April
instead of the current June.

The extension of seasonal

closure would have little effect on public ground fishery
because demand is low and the total revenue negative during
these two months.

This conclusion is valid only when the

stock levels recover.

Second, the objective of an increase in public oysters
to 700,000 bushels or an 85 percent increase in the observed
mean may be set too high.

The simulation results indicate

that total revenue for public ground fishery falls quickly.
This study suggests that to maintain a high level of public
production set by the OFMP may not be necessary if a large
investment is required to achieve it.

Table 20.

The net percentage increase in the total
revenue for public oysters.

Group One Experiment
Month
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May

OFMP
0. 846
1.143
0. 789
0.220
0.404
0.156
-0.343
-0.555

2
0.5
0.786
0.607
0.313
0.486
0.322
0.088
-0.015

3
-0.5
-0.478
-0.511
-0.536
-0.473
-0.481
-0.467
-0.472

4
0
0.142
0.058
-0.054
0.073
0.012
-0.042
-0.079

5
0
0.105
0. 002
-0.119
0.015
-0.049
-0.132
-0.152
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Private Ovster Cultivation

The results of simulation indicate that the total
revenue for private planters will increase as Virginia
oyster production increases.

The rate of net revenue is

relatively high (Table 21), suggesting that a high level of
private production will yield large revenue to private
oyster industry.

Thus, regulations to provide incentives to

private oyster cultivation are necessary.

The results of the model indicate that production of
seed oysters is unimportant for providing private production
within observed periods.

The seed production unrelated to

private production may result from the high disease
mortality —

the ORP's goal of providing sufficient seed

oysters to private planters may be irrelevant.

This study

suggests that the ORP may provide low costs of seed oysters
to private planters.

Historically, private production was dominant in
Virginia oyster production.

Oyster production from private

leased grounds was more efficient in producing oysters than
public grounds (Haven et a l ., 1981).

Also, the results of

simulation indicate that an increase in Virginia oyster
production will largely benefit the private oyster industry.

Table 21.

The net percentage increase in the total
revenue for private oysters.

Group One Experiment
Month
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May

OFMP

2

3

4

5

1.452
1.635
1.650
2.494
2.892
3.400
3.283
3.089

0.5
0.549
0.492
0.871
1. 007
1.226
1.129
0.987

-0.5
-0.503
-0.544
-0.464
-0.456
-0.416
-0.459
-0.516

0
0.010
-0.053
0.148
0.197
0.306
0.228
0.123

0
0. 017
-0.037
0. 173
0.224
0.339
0.268
0.159
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Hargis and Haven (1988b) suggest that to revive the Virginia
oyster industry, the OFMP should rely on increasing private
production.

Introduction of the Pacific Oysters

The introduction of the Pacific oysters into the West
Coast has revived the oyster industry there.

Thus, the

suggestion of introducing Pacific oysters into Virginia has
emerged.

The Pacific oyster, unlike the eastern oyster, is

less susceptible to diseases (Leffler, 1988), and it is
believed that the Pacific oyster may have a higher survival
rate than the eastern oyster in unfavorable conditions
(VIMS, 1991).

However, there is also a fear that the exotic

Pacific oyster may expel the native oyster (Leffler, 1988).
Since this study is not concerned with the biological
characteristics of oysters, all suggestions will be based on
the market interactions among oysters from various areas.

The results of the model suggest that oysters from
public grounds are independent or weakly complementary to
the Pacific oysters, meaning that the oysters will not
compete with each other in the Virginia market, and
introducing Pacific oysters to Virginia waters may have
little effect on public production.

Alternatively, the

Pacific oysters are substitutes for oysters from private
leased grounds.

Since both oysters are substitutable in the

Virginia oyster market, raising Pacific oysters in private
leased grounds may be an alternative to private planters.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

An overview

Virginia oyster production has declined because of many
factors, and to revive the industry, VMRC has developed the
OFMP to improve oyster production.

The purposes of the

study were to examine the market interrelationships among
oysters from different sources and to evaluate the effect of
the OFMP on the Virginia oyster market.

The Analytical Framework

This study developed the conceptual framework of the
Virginia oyster market.

The framework assumed that the

Virginia oyster market was in equilibrium; although various
laws and regulations have been posed on public ground
fishery, the assumption of market equilibrium was
maintained.

Since Virginia processors obtained various oysters from
different sources, this study proposed that the Virginia
124
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oyster market was made up of three sectors: public ground
fishery, private oyster cultivation, and oyster supply from
other regions.

A complete market system consisted of eight

market functions.

These market relationships were estimated

through the use of econometric analysis by the FIML
technique.

The OFMP would greatly increase oyster production from
public ground fishery and private leased grounds, and its
success therefore would have a large effect on the current
Virginia oyster market.

A simulation model was used to

project the impact of the OFMP on market behavior.

Virginia Oyster Market

The empirical results of the econometric analysis
suggested that the market equilibrium for the public sector
consisted of an elastic demand curve and a very inelastic
supply curve, but the private market sector consisted of an
inelastic demand curve and an elastic supply curve.

The

difference between the public and private oyster market
resulted from a lower price in the private market sector.

The market relationships among oysters from different
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sources were identified.

Oysters from public grounds were

complementary to oysters from private leased grounds and
outside supplies.

An increase in the ex-vessel price would

thus decrease the demand for private oysters and outside
supplies.

Alternatively, oysters from private leased grounds
substituted for oysters from other regions, suggesting that
oysters from private leased grounds would compete with
outside supplies.

An increase in the price paid to the

former would increase the demand for the latter.

Pacific oysters were independent of public oysters and
substitutes for private oysters.

Changes in production and

ex-vessel price of Washington oysters would not affect the
demand for public oysters, but the demand for private
oysters would be reduced if the ex-vessel price of
Washington oysters decreased .

Simulation and Oyster Management

The results of simulation indicated that the OFMP would
decrease the ex-vessel price but increase the total revenue
for public ground fishery industry, excepting April and May.
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Since the demand for public oysters was relatively low in
the late oyster season, this study suggested the possibility
of extending the closure of oyster seasons from April to
September.

The extended closure of oyster seasons between

April and May would have little effect on public ground
fishery.

The suggestion was valid only if the objectives of

the OFMP was achieved.

The simulation results also indicated that the OFMP
would greatly increase the total revenue for the private
oyster industry, a move caused by an increase in the demand
for private oysters and the supply of public oysters.

The

study suggested that the OFMP might provide incentive
programs to private oyster cultivation.

On the other hand,

if oyster production declined continuously, the total
revenue for both private oyster cultivation and public
ground fishery would be reduced.

Pacific oysters were independent of oysters from public
grounds and were substitutes for oysters from private leased
grounds.

Thus, the study suggested that introducing Pacific

oysters into Virginia waters would have little effect on
public oysters but would provide an alternative for private
planters, a suggestion based on market interaction.
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Conclusions and Future Research

The purposes of this study were to outline the Virginia
shellstock market for oysters from public and private leased
grounds and to identify the interrelationships among various
oyster sources.

The study also projected the impacts of the

OFMP on the Virginia oyster market.

Several limitations

restricted the completeness of the empirical results.

A major limitation was that the model was restricted to
a market in which only public ground fishery existed.
Closure of the fishing season created a fundamental problem
for the analysis.

All data between June and September were

omitted so that the estimation could be carried out.
Fortunately, the results of an additional private model
suggested that the effect of the seasonal closure on the
private market sector was small.

A related problem was the inadequate disease indicator
for representing the threat of diseases.

The additional

private model indicated that the problem of the disease
index was caused by excluding the June-September season from
the model, thus underestimating the effect of diseases on
oyster production.

Another limitation was associated with the limited
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data.

Prior to 1986, the monthly price paid for oysters

from other states was unavailable.

Lacking this price

variable, the outside sector market cannot be completely
estimated.

Furthermore, the estimation might be biased, as

the variable was excluded.

The limitation suggested that

additional information would be gained by including the
variable in future research.

The approach was based on market behavior, which
allowed responses to changes in economic conditions to be
analyzed.

Despite many limitations of the study, the

approach and related analyses improved the understanding of
the Virginia oyster market.

The approach also provided

valuable implications for oyster management strategies.
Finally, and most importantly, the approach provided a
richness of economic information on the Virginia oyster
market.
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